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Linear-Quadratic Time-Inconsistent Mean-Field
Type Stackelberg Differential Games:
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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the linear-quadratic time-
inconsistent mean-field leader-follower Stackelberg stochastic dif-
ferential game with an adapted open-loop information structure.
Given a controlled linear stochastic differential equation (SDE),
the quadratic objective functionals of the leader and the follower
include conditional expectations of state and control (mean field)
variables. In addition, the cost parameters could be general
nonexponential discounting depending on the initial time. As
stated in the existing literature, these two general settings of
the objective functionals induce time inconsistency in the optimal
solutions. Given an arbitrary control of the leader, we first obtain
the follower’s (time-consistent) equilibrium control and its state
feedback representation in terms of the nonsymmetric coupled
Riccati differential equations (RDEs) and the backward SDE.
This provides the rational behavior of the follower, characterized
by the forward-backward SDE (FBSDE). We then obtain the
leader’s explicit (time-consistent) equilibrium control and its state
feedback representation in terms of the nonsymmetric coupled
RDEs, where the constraint of the leader’s problem is the FBSDE
induced by the follower’s rational behavior. With the solvability of
the nonsymmetric coupled RDEs, the equilibrium controls of the
leader and the follower constitute the time-consistent Stackelberg
equilibrium of the paper. Finally, the numerical examples are
provided to check the solvability of the nonsymmetric coupled
RDEs of the leader and the follower.
Index Terms—time-inconsistent stochastic control problem,
equilibrium control, Stackelberg differential games, mean-field
stochastic systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important features of (deterministic and
stochastic) optimal control that is typically not emphasized
is time consistency, which states that the optimal solution
obtained with respect to the initial time t ∈ [0, T ] and the
initial state x(t) = x (equivalently the initial pair (t, x))
remains optimal when it is restricted on [τ, T ] with the initial
condition x(τ) (equivalently the initial pair (τ, x(τ)) with
τ ∈ (t, T ] [1]–[4].1 The time-consistent property stems from
Bellman’s principle of optimality (dynamic programming),
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1As mentioned in [1], it can also be stated that the optimal control viewed
at present will also be optimal when it is viewed at a later time.
which formulates the optimal control problem as a family
of the initial pair (t, x). In fact, the dynamic programming
approach provides a theoretical foundation for optimal control
theory (and differential games) by characterizing the value
function in terms of the initial pair (t, x), which leads to the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation [5]–[7].
We expect that all (deterministic and stochastic) optimal
control problems hold the time-consistent property. However,
in many situations, the time-consistency fails. Specifically, as
discussed in the examples of [3, Examples 1.1 and 1.2], [8,
Section 2] and [4], [9], this is due to the fact that
(1) the cost parameters in the objective functional could be
general nonexponential discounting parameters that are
dependent on the initial time;
(2) the conditional expectations of state and control variables
could be included in the state equation (e.g. stochastic
differential equation, SDE) and the objective functional.
Under the above two general settings, time-inconsistent (de-
terministic and stochastic) optimal control problems can be
formulated. Regarding (1), in [10]–[19], time-inconsistent (de-
terministic and stochastic) optimal control problems with gen-
eral (nonexponential) discounting parameters including quasi-
exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting, and quasi-
geometric discounting were considered. The purpose of in-
troducing general nonexponential discounting parameters in
the objective functional is to capture the various discounted
preferences of the optimizer (or user) with respect to the initial
time and state. As for (2), the time-consistency fails since
the law of iterated expectations cannot be applied to obtain a
dynamic programming equation [16]. In fact, the conditional
expectations of state and control variables are known as mean
field variables. The motivation to include mean-field variables
in the state equation (e.g. SDE) and the objective functional
is to analyze macroscopic behavior of large-scale interacting
particle systems in engineering, biology and economics, and
to consider mean-variance portfolio optimization in various
mathematical finance applications [1], [3], [8], [16], [20]–[32].
There are various definitions for quantifying “optimality”
in (deterministic and stochastic) time-inconsistent optimal
control problems. First, one could search for a precommitted
optimal solution, which is optimal only for a prescribed initial
pair (t, x). This definition corresponds to the standard optimal
solution, which can be characterized by a usual variational
approach. Note that the precommitted optimal solution is time-
inconsistent; hence, it is not implementable in the sense that
2at a later time τ > t, we have to search for a second
(precommitted) optimal solution [16], [18]. Second, instead of
a precommitted optimal solution, an equilibrium control can
be sought, which is local with respect to spike variation but
time consistent [26, Definition 2.1].2 The equilibrium control
concept is related to an (adapted for the stochastic case) open-
loop control, which can be obtained by using the (stochastic)
maximum principle. One advantage of this definition is that it
is mathematically rigorous, and in some situations the equi-
librium control can be expressed as a feedback representation
using the decoupling method [1], [3], [26]. The results of [1],
[26] were extended to the jump diffusion case in [33], [34].
The last definition corresponds to the closed-loop or state-
feedback type control. This can be characterized by solving
the HJB equation obtained by discretizing the corresponding
optimal control problem, which is closely related to the multi-
person differential game [2], [3], [8], [9], [14]–[18], [24],
[35], [36]. In addition, the mixed equilibrium solution concept
was used in [37], and the Markovian framework for time-
inconsistent linear-quadratic problems was developed in [38].
We note that the aforementioned references correspond to
a class of time-inconsistent optimal control problems, where
there is one single control (decision maker) in the state
equation and the objective functional. Within this formulation,
hierarchical decision-making analysis between players cannot
be considered. Then it is natural to extend the earlier results
for time-inconsistent optimal control problems to the leader-
follower game framework, subject to a prescribed decision-
making hierarchy. It should be noted that the time-inconsistent
leader-follower game has not been considered in the existing
literature, and this problem is addressed in our paper (see the
problem formulation and the summary of the main results of
the paper in Section I-A).
The class of leader-follower differential games is also
known as Stackelberg differential games [39]–[41]. The leader
holds a dominating position; the leader chooses and then
announces his optimal strategy by considering the rational
behavior of the follower. Under this hierarchical setting, the
leader’s optimal solution and the follower’s rational behavior
constitute a Stackelberg equilibrium. Classical (deterministic
and stochastic) Stackelberg differential games have been stud-
ied extensively in the literature; see [29], [39]–[45] and the
references therein. Note that depending on the open-loop or
closed-loop information structure between the leader and the
follower, the Stackelberg game has to be treated differently.3
In particular, for the adapted open-loop case, the (stochastic)
Stackelberg game can be analyzed by applying the stochastic
maximum principle to the following: (i) the follower’s problem
given an arbitrary strategy of the leader and (ii) the leader’s
problem, where the constraint is the follower’s rational be-
havior characterized by the forward-backward SDE (FBSDE)
from (i) [39]–[41]. There are wide ranges of applications
for Stackelberg games including engineering, economics and
2It is called the equilibrium control, since it is an equilibrium with respect
to all his admissible controls in the future [1].
3See [39] and [41] for definitions and discussions of open-loop and
closed-loop information structures in Stackelberg differential games, and the
approaches with respect to different information structures.
biology; see [29], [46]–[50] and the references therein.
A. Problem Statement and Main Results of the Paper
In this paper, we consider the linear-quadratic (LQ)
time-inconsistent mean-field Stackelberg stochastic differential
game for the leader and the follower. The adapted open-loop
information structure is adopted in the sense that the follower
chooses his optimal decision after the leader announces his
optimal strategy over the entire horizon [40], [41]. In the
problem setting, a linear stochastic differential equation (SDE)
controlled by the leader and the follower is given, where their
control variables are also included in the diffusion term of the
SDE.4 The objective functionals of the leader and the follower
are quadratic, where the conditional expectations of state
and control variables (mean field) are nonlinearly included,
and the cost parameters could be general nonexponential
discounting, depending on the initial time. As mentioned, these
two general settings of the objective functionals induce the
time inconsistency of optimal solutions for the leader and the
follower.
Our main results of the paper can be summarized as follows:
(i) we obtain the follower’s equilibrium control5 that is a
function of an arbitrary leader’s control (see Proposition
1). Then we obtain its state feedback representation
in terms of the nonsymmetric coupled Riccati differ-
ential equations (RDEs) and the backward stochastic
differential equation (BSDE) (see Theorem 1). Note that
the follower’s equilibrium control induces the rational
behavior of the follower that is characterized by the
forward-backward SDE (FBSDE);
(ii) the explicit leader’s equilibrium control5 is obtained,
where the constraint of the leader’s equilibrium control
problem is the rational behavior of the follower that is
the FBSDE from (i) (see Theorem 2). We obtain the
state feedback representation of the leader’s equilibrium
control in terms of the nonsymmetric coupled RDEs via
the generalized decoupling technique (see Theorem 3);
(iii) with the solvability of the nonsymmetric coupled RDEs
in (i) and (ii), the results of (i) and (ii) constitute the time-
consistent (adapted open-loop) Stackelberg equilibrium
for the leader and the follower (see Corollary 1);
(iv) numerical examples are provided to check the solvability
of the nonsymmetric coupled RDEs in (i) and (ii).
Note that the problem formulation and the results of the
paper can be viewed as extensions of those in [40], [50]
to the time-inconsistent problem, and those in [3], [25] to
the Stackelberg game framework. In [50], the LQ mean-field
Stackelberg game was considered, where the corresponding
Stackelberg equilibrium is precommitted, i.e., it is time incon-
sistent. The extensions of [40], [50] to the time-inconsistent
setting are not trivial, since the approach for characterizing the
(time-consistent) equilibrium control is completely different
4This implies that the magnitude of the stochastic noise is controlled by
the leader and the follower, which can be viewed as multiplicative noise of
the system [51], [52].
5As mentioned, an equilibrium control is time consistent; see Definition 2
or [3, Definition 4.1] and [26, Definition 2.1].
3from that of the the precommitted (time-inconsistent) optimal
solution as discussed in [1], [3], [26]. On the other hand, in [3]
the time-inconsistent mean-field control problem was studied,
where the (adapted open-loop time-consistent) equilibrium
control was obtained. Note that the extension of [3] to the
Stackelberg game is also challenging, since in (ii) in the
preceding list, we need to solve the leader’s time-inconsistent
stochastic optimal control problem with the FBSDE constraint
induced by the follower. We mention that the time-inconsistent
stochastic optimal control problem with the FBSDE constraint
has not been studied in the existing literature.
The paper is organized as follows. The problem formulation
is stated in Section II. The equilibrium control problems of the
follower and the leader are considered in Sections III and IV,
respectively. Numerical examples are presented in Section V.
The concluding remarks are given in Section VI.
Notation: Let Rn be the n-dimensional Euclidian space,
and Sn the set of n× n dimensional symmetric matrices. For
x ∈ Rn, x⊤ denotes its transpose. Let 〈x, y〉 be the inner
product and |x| := 〈x, x〉1/2 for x, y ∈ Rn. Let |x|2S = x
⊤Sx
for x ∈ Rn and S ∈ Sn. ForX ∈ Sn, let X > 0 (resp. X ≥ 0)
be a positive semidefinite (resp. positive definite) matrix. I
denotes an identity matrix with an appropriate dimension.
Let L∞([t, T ],Rn) be the set of Rn-valued functions with
‖f‖∞ = sups∈[t,T ] |f(s)| < ∞ for f ∈ L
∞([t, T ],Rn). Let
(Ω,F ,P, {Ft}t≥0) be a complete filtered probability space on
which a one dimensional standard Brownian motion B(·) is
defined, where F = {Ft}t≥0 is a natural filtration generated
by the Brownian motion augmented by all the P-null sets
in F . Let E be the mathematical expectation operator and
Et[·] = E[·|Ft]. Let SF([t, T ],R
n) be the set of Rn-valued F-
adapted stochastic processes such that for x ∈ SF([t, T ],R
n),
x is continuous and satisfies Et[sups∈[t,T ] |x(s)|
2] < ∞.
For p ≥ 1, let Lp
F
([t, T ],Rn) be the set of Rn-valued F-
adapted stochastic processes such that for x ∈ Lp
F
([t, T ],Rn),
x satisfies Et[
∫ T
t
|x(s)|pds] <∞.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider the following stochastic differential equation
(SDE) driven by Brownian motion:
dx(s) =
[
A(s)x(s) +B1(s)u(s) +B2(s)v(s)
]
ds
+
[
C(s)x(s) +D1(s)u(s) +D2(s)v(s)
]
dB(s), s ∈ [t, T ]
x(t) = x0,
(1)
where x ∈ Rn is state with the initial condition x(t) = x0
and t ∈ [0, T ], u ∈ Rm1 is control of the leader and v ∈
R
m2 is control of the follower. In (1), A,C : [0, T ]→ Rn×n
and Bi, Di : [0, T ] → R
n×mi , i = 1, 2, are deterministic
coefficient matrices with A,C ∈ L∞([0, T ],Rn) and Bi, Di ∈
L∞([0, T ],Rmi) for i = 1, 2. The sets of admissible controls
of the leader is defined as follows:
U [t, T ]
= {u : [t, T ]× Ω× Rn → Rm1 | u ∈ L2
F
([t, T ],Rm1)}.
The set of admissible controls for the follower, V [t, T ], is
defined in a similar way. Then for any u ∈ U [t, T ] and
v ∈ V [t, T ], there exists a unique solution of (1) that satisfies
E[sups∈[t,T ] |x(s)|
2] <∞, i.e., x ∈ SF([t, T ],R
n) [6, Chapter
1, Theorem 6.14] (see also [7, Theorem 2.2]).6 Let xu,v be the
state process in (1) controlled by u ∈ U [t, T ] and v ∈ V [t, T ].
The objective functional of the leader is given by
J1(t, x0;u, v) (2)
= Et
[∫ T
t
[
|x(s)|2Q1(s,t) + |Et[x(s)]|
2
Q¯1(s,t)
+ |u(s)|2R1(s,t)
+ |Et[u(s)]|
2
R¯1(s,t)
]
ds+ |x(T )|2M1(t) + |Et[x(T )]|
2
M¯1(t)
]
,
and the objective functional of the follower is as follows
J2(t, x0;u, v) (3)
= Et
[∫ T
t
[
|x(s)|2Q2(s,t) + |Et[x(s)]|
2
Q¯2(s,t)
+ |v(s)|2R2(s,t)
+ |Et[v(s)]|
2
R¯2(s,t)
]
ds+ |x(T )|2M2(t) + |Et[x(T )]|
2
M¯2(t)
]
.
In (2) and (3), the cost parameters hold Qi, Q¯i ∈ L
∞([0, T ]×
[0, T ], Sn), Mi, M¯i ∈ L
∞([0, T ], Sn) and Ri, R¯i ∈
L∞([0, T ]× [0, T ], Smi) for i = 1, 2. It is assumed that
Qi(s, t) ≥ 0, Qi(s, t) + Q¯i(s, t) ≥ 0
Mi(t) ≥ 0, Mi(t) ≥ 0,Mi(t) + M¯i(t) ≥ 0
Ri(s, t) > 0, Ri(s, t) + R¯i(s, t) > 0
s ∈ [t, T ], t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2.
(4)
In (2) and (3), the cost parameters depend on the initial time
t. In addition, not only the state and control variables, but
also their conditional expectations are included nonlinearly
in the objective functionals in (2) and (3). The conditional
expectation terms in (2) and (3) are also known as mean field
of state and control variables [3], [25], [30], [31], [50].
The interaction between the leader and the follower can
be stated as follows. The leader chooses and announces his
optimal solution to the follower by considering the rational
reaction of the follower. The follower then determines his
optimal solution by responding to the optimal solution of the
leader. Under this setting, the problem can be solved in a
reverse way [40], [41]. Specifically,
(S.1) solve the follower’s optimal control problem with arbi-
trary x0 ∈ R
n and control of the leader u ∈ U [t, T ], that
is, minimize J2(t, x0;u, v) over v ∈ V [t, T ] subject to
(1) for any x0 ∈ R
n and u ∈ U [t, T ], where its solution
is denoted by v¯ ∈ V [t, T ];
(S.2) obtain the leader’s optimal solution, denoted by u¯ ∈
U [t, T ], by minimizing J1(t, x0;u, v¯) over u ∈ U [t, T ]
subject to (1) with v replaced by the follower’s optimal
solution v¯ obtained from (i).
6The assumption of the one-dimensional Brownian motion in (1) is only
for notational convenience, and we can easily extend the results of the paper
to the multi-dimensional Brownian motion case.
4In general, the optimal solution of the follower from (S.1),
v¯ ∈ V [t, T ], depends on an arbitrary u ∈ U [t, T ] and the
initial condition x0 ∈ R
n. In fact, (S.1) above characterizes
the rational reaction behavior of the follower, which is the
optimization constraint of (S.2).
Due to the hierarchy between the leader and the follower
mentioned above, the problem considered in the paper can be
referred to as the (adapted open-loop) linear-quadratic (LQ)
mean-field Stackelberg differential game [39]–[41]. We also
note that if the solutions to (S.1) and (S.2) exist, then the
pair (u¯, v¯) constitutes the (adapted open-loop) Stackelberg
equilibrium [40], [41] (see also Definition 1 below).
Now, suppose that the cost parameters in (2) and (3) do not
depend on the initial time, i.e., for i = 1, 2,
Qi(s, t) = Qi(s), Q¯i(s, t) = Q¯i(s)
Ri(s, t) = Ri(s), R¯i(s, t) = R¯i(s)
Mi(t) = Mi, M¯i(t) = M¯i.
(5)
Then with (4) and (5), the (adapted open-loop) Stackelberg
equilibrium was obtained in [50, Theorems 3.1-3.3], where its
precise definition is given as follows [50, Definition 2.1]:
Definition 1: The pair (u¯, v¯) ∈ U [t, T ] × V [t, T ] constitutes
an (adapted open-loop) Stackelberg equilibrium, and x¯ :=
xu¯,v¯ ∈ SF([t, T ],R
n) is the corresponding state process if the
following conditions hold.
(i) There exists a measurable map α : U [t, T ]×Rn → V [t, T ]
such that for any u ∈ U [t, T ],
J2(t, x0;u, α[u, x0]) = inf
v∈V[t,T ]
J2(t, x0;u, v);
(ii) There exists a control u¯ ∈ U [t, T ] such that
J1(t, x0; u¯, α[u¯, x0]) = inf
u∈U [t,T ]
J1(t, x0;u, α[u, x0]);
(iii) v¯ = α[u¯, x0] with the state process x¯ = x
u¯,v¯ = xu¯,α[u¯,x0].

The results in [50] were obtained via the variational method.
This approach can also be applied to the problem of the
paper (that is without assuming (5)). However, in this case the
corresponding (adapted open-loop) Stackelberg equilibrium
(see Definition 1) would be time inconsistent7 in the sense that
the Stackelberg solution at time t may not be the Stackelberg
solution at any F-stopping time τ ∈ (t, T ] [1], [3], [4], [8],
[9], [24], [26], [30], [50]. This is due to the fact that
(F.1) the cost parameters in (2) and (3) (which are Qi(s, t),
Q¯i(s, t), Ri(s, t), R¯i(s, t), Mi(t) and M¯i(t), i = 1, 2)
could be general nonexponential discounting parameters
that are dependent on the initial time t [3], [9], [30], [34];
(F.2) the mean field (the conditional expectations) of state and
control variables are included in the objective functionals
in a nonlinear way [1], [3], [9], [24], [26].
In view of the above discussion and due to (F.1) and (F.2),
the problem of the paper can be regarded as the linear-
7Specifically, under (4), with the objective functionals in (2) and (3), the
Stackelberg equilibrium in Definition 1 can be obtained by using the results in
[50, Theorems 3.1-3.3]. However, the corresponding Stackelberg equilibrium
is time inconsistent due to (F.1) and (F.2) [3].
quadratic (LQ) time-inconsistent mean-field Stackelberg differ-
ential game (Problem LQ-TI-MF-SDG). We also mention
that the time-inconsistent Stackelberg equilibrium studied in
[50] with Definition 1 is closely related to the precommitted
optimal solutions of the leader and the follower, since they are
optimal only when viewed at the initial time [1], [3], [16].
Now, given the time-inconsistent nature of Problem
LQ-TI-MF-SDG as indicated in the preceding section, the
objective of our paper is to obtain the time-consistent Stack-
elberg solution of Problem LQ-TI-MF-SDG. Hence, it is
necessary to modify the notion of “optimality” in Definition 1
using the the time-consistent equilibrium solution concept used
in the time-inconsistent stochastic optimal control problems
studied in [1], [3], [9], [24], [26], [30] (see [3, Definition 4.1]
and [26, Definition 2.1]). Before stating its specific definition,
we introduce the following “infinitesimally” perturbed control
of the leader via spike variation: Given a control u∗ ∈ U [t, T ],
for almost all t ∈ [0, T ), ǫ > 0 and any u ∈ U [t, T ], define
uǫ(s) = u∗(s)1s∈[t+ǫ,T ] + u(s)1s∈[t,t+ǫ), s ∈ [t, T ], (6)
where 1 is an indicator function. Similarly, given α[u, x0] :
U [t, T ]×Rn → V [t, T ] with a fixed u ∈ U [t, T ], for almost all
t ∈ [0, T ), ǫ > 0 and any v ∈ V [t, T ] with s ∈ [t, T ], define
αǫ[u, x0](s) = α[u, x0](s)1s∈[t+ǫ,T ] + v(s)1s∈[t,t+ǫ). (7)
Definition 2: The pair (u∗, v∗) ∈ U [t, T ]×V [t, T ] constitutes
a time-consistent (adapted open-loop) Stackelberg equilibrium
of Problem LQ-TI-MF-SDG for the leader and the fol-
lower, and x∗ := xu
∗,v∗ ∈ SF([t, T ],R
n) with x∗(t) = x0 is
corresponding the equilibrium state process if for any initial
condition x0, the following conditions hold:
(i) For any given u ∈ U [t, T ] and almost all t ∈ [0, T ), there
are measurable map α : U [t, T ]×Rn → V [t, T ] and the
corresponding state process xu,α[u,x0] such that
lim inf
ǫ↓0
1
ǫ
(
J2(t, x0;u, α
ǫ[u, x0])
− J2(t, x0;u, α[u, x0])
)
≥ 0,
where αǫ is defined in (7). For the pair (xu,α[u,x0], α),
α is called the equilibrium control of the follower under
an arbitrary u ∈ U [t, T ] of the leader, and xu,α[u,x0] is
the corresponding equilibrium state process.
(ii) For almost all t ∈ [0, T ), there are u∗ ∈ U [t, T ] and the
corresponding state process xu
∗,α[u∗,x0] such that
lim inf
ǫ↓0
1
ǫ
(
J1(t, x0;u
ǫ, α[uǫ, x0])
− J1(t, x0;u
∗, α[u∗, x0])
)
≥ 0,
where uǫ is defined in (6) and α is the equilibrium control
of the follower in (i). For the pair (xu
∗,α[u∗,x0], u∗),
u∗ is called the equilibrium control of the leader and
xu
∗,α[u∗,x0] is the corresponding equilibrium state pro-
cess.
(iii) v∗ = α[u∗, x0] with the equilibrium state process x
∗ =
xu
∗,v∗ = xu
∗,α[u∗,x0]. 
5Note that Definition 2 is local in an infinitesimal sense.
In (i) and (ii) of Definition 2, the two equilibrium pairs,
(xu,α[u,x0], α) and (xu
∗,α[u∗,x0], u∗), can be viewed as the
one-player (time-consistent) equilibrium solution for the time-
inconsistent stochastic optimal control problem [1], [3], [26].
Hence, Definition 2(i) implies that for any u ∈ U [t, T ], the
follower plays a game at any time t against all his admissible
controls in the future. The same argument applies to the
leader’s case with Definition 2(ii).
III. FOLLOWER’S EQUILIBRIUM CONTROL
This section considers the follower’s equilibrium control
problem in the sense of Definition 2(i). The follower’s problem
is denoted by Problem LQ-FEC (LQ follower’s equilibrium
control problem). We state the following result:
Proposition 1: Consider Problem LQ-FEC with (4). For
any u ∈ U [t, T ], suppose that the pair (x∗, v∗), where v∗ :=
α : U [t, T ]×Rn → V [t, T ] and x∗ := xu,α[u,x0] = xu,v
∗
with
x∗(t) = x0, is the state-control pair of the follower. Consider
the backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE):
dp(s, t) = −
[
A⊤(s)p(s, t) + C⊤(s)q(s, t) +Q2(s, t)x
∗(s)
+Q¯2(s, t)Et[x
∗(s)]
]
ds+ q(s, t)dB(s), s ∈ [t, T ]
p(T, t) =M2(t)x(T ) + M¯2(t)Et[x(T )].
(8)
Suppose that (p, q) ∈ L2
F
([0, T ] × [0, T ],Rn) × L2
F
([0, T ] ×
[0, T ],Rn) is the solution to the BSDE in (8), which is contin-
uous in both s ∈ [t, T ] and t ∈ [0, T ]. Then the corresponding
unique (open-loop) equilibrium control of the follower satisfies
for t ∈ [0, T ], with R̂2(s, t) = R2(s, t) + R¯2(s, t),
R̂2(t, t)v
∗(t) +B⊤2 (t)p(t, t) +D
⊤
2 (t)q(t, t) = 0. (9)
In particular, for t ∈ [0, T ], we have
v∗(t) = −R̂−12 (t, t)[B
⊤
2 (t)p(t, t) +D
⊤
2 (t)q(t, t)]. (10)
Proof: The result follows from [3, Proposition 4.2] (see also
[1, Theorem 3.2] or [26, Theorem 3.5]) with the perturbed
control defined in (7). Also, by using the approach in [26,
Theorem 3.5], we can show that (9) is the necessary and
sufficient condition for the equilibrium control of the follower,
which implies the uniqueness. This completes the proof. 
In view of Proposition 1, we have the forward-backward
stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) with the optimality
condition in (10) (note that ∗ notation is dropped in x):
dx(s) =
[
A(s)x(s) +B1(s)u(s)
+B2(s)v
∗(s)
]
ds+
[
C(s)x(s) +D1(s)u(s)
+D2(s)v
∗(s)
]
dB(s), s ∈ [t, T ]
dp(s, t) = −
[
A⊤(s)p(s, t) + C⊤(s)q(s, t)
+Q2(s, t)x(s) + Q¯2(s, t)Et[x(s)]
]
ds
+q(s, t)dB(s), s ∈ [t, T ]
x(t) = x0
p(T, t) = M2(t)x(T ) + M¯2(t)Et[x(T )],
(11)
where v∗ satisfies the optimality condition in (9) that is given
below for convenience
R̂2(t, t)v
∗(t) +B⊤2 (t)p(t, t) +D
⊤
2 (t)q(t, t) = 0.
This corresponds to the rational behavior of the follower for
an arbitrary control of the leader.
We now obtain the state feedback representation of the
open-loop equilibrium control of the follower in (10). By
applying the Four-Step Scheme8 used in [6], [40], [53], [54],
we consider the following transformation to decouple forward
and backward parts of the SDE:
p(s, t) = P (s, t)x(s) + Z(s, t)Et[x(s)] + h(s), (12)
where the explicit expressions of P and Z will be obtained
later. Here, it is assumed that P,Z : [0, T ]× [0, T ]→ Rn×n,
and h is the first component of the n-dimensional BSDE that
will be characterized later. Note that in view of the terminal
condition of (8), we must have P (T, t) = M2(t), Z(T, t) =
M¯2(t) and h(T ) = 0. Let P̂ (s, t) = P (s, t) + Z(s, t).
By using Itoˆ’s formula, we have
dp(s, t) (13)
= −
[
A⊤(s)p(s, t) + C⊤(s)q(s, t) +Q2(s, t)x(s)
+ Q¯2(s, t)Et[x(s)]
]
ds+ q(s, t)dB(s)
=
dP (s, t)
ds
x(s)ds+
dZ(s, t)
ds
Et[x(s)]ds
+ P (s, t)
[
A(s)x(s) +B1(s)u(s) +B2(s)v
∗(s)
]
ds
+ P (s, t)
[
C(s)x(s) +D1(s)u(s) +D2(s)v
∗(s)
]
dB(s)
+ Z(s, t)
[
A(s)Et[x(s)] +B1(s)Et[u(s)]
+B2(s)Et[v
∗(s)]
]
ds+ k(s)ds+ l(s)dB(s),
where dh(s) = k(s)ds+ l(s)dB(s). Then
q(s, t) = P (s, t)
[
C(s)x(s) (14)
+D1(s)u(s) +D2(s)v
∗(s)
]
+ l(s).
By substituting (12) and (14) into the optimality condition
in (9), we have
R̂2(t, t)v
∗(t) +B⊤2 (t)
[
P̂ (t, t)x(t) + h(t)
]
+D⊤2 (t)P (t, t)
×
[
C(t)x(t) +D1(t)u(t) +D2(t)v
∗(t)
]
+D⊤2 (t)l(t) = 0,
which implies
v∗(t) = α[u, x0](t) (15)
= −
[
R̂2(t, t) +D
⊤
2 (t)P (t, t)D2(s)
]−1
×
[(
B⊤2 (t)P̂ (t, t) +D
⊤
2 (t)P (t, t)C(t)
)
x(t)
+
(
B⊤2 (t)h(t) +D
⊤
2 (t)P (t, t)D1(t)u(t) +D
⊤
2 (t)l(t)
)]
.
v∗ in (15) is the feedback representation of the follower’s equi-
librium control in (10) that is obtained by the transformations
in (12) and (14). Note that (15) depends on an arbitrary control
8This approach is quite similar to decoupling between adjoint and state
equations used in LQ optimal control problems [5], [6].
6of the leader as in Definition 2(i).
From (14) and (15), we have
q(s, t) = P (s, t)C(s)x(s) + P (s, t)D1(s)u(s) + l(s) (16)
− P (s, t)D2(s)
[
R̂2(s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)D2(s)
]−1
×
[
B⊤2 (s)P̂ (s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)C(s)
]
x(s)
− P (s, t)D2(s)
[
R̂2(s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)D2(s)
]−1
×
[
B⊤2 (s)h(s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)D1(s)u(s) +D
⊤
2 (s)l(s)
]
.
By substituting (12), (15) and (16) into (13), we have
dp(s, t)
= −
[
A⊤(s)P (s, t)x(s) +A⊤(s)Z(s, t)Et[x(s)]
+A⊤(s)h(s) + C⊤(s)P (s, t)C(s)x(s)
+ C⊤(s)P (s, t)D1(s)u(s) + C
⊤(s)l(s)
− C⊤(s)P (s, t)D2(s)
×
[
R̂2(s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)D2(s)
]−1
×
[
B⊤2 (s)P̂ (s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)C(s)
]
x(s)
− C⊤(s)P (s, t)D2(s)
×
[
R̂2(s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)D2(s)
]−1
×
[
B⊤2 (s)h(s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)D1(s)u(s)
+D⊤2 (s)l(s)
]
+Q2(s, t)x(s)
+ Q¯2(s, t)Et[x(s)]
]
ds+ q(s, t)dB(s),
and
dp(s, t) =
dP (s, t)
ds
x(s)ds +
dZ(s, t)
ds
Et[x(s)]ds
+ P (s, t)A(s)x(s)ds + P (s, t)B1(s)u(s)ds
− P (s, t)B2(s)
[
R̂2(s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)D2(s)
]−1
×
[
B⊤2 (s)P̂ (s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)C(s)
]
x(s)ds
− P (s, t)B2(s)
[
R̂2(s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)D2(s)
]−1
×
[
B⊤2 (s)h(s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)D1(s)u(s)
+D⊤2 (s)l(s)
]
ds+ P (s, t)
×
[
C(s)x(s) +D1(s)u(s) +D2(s)v
∗(s)
]
dB(s)
+ Z(s, t)A(s)Et[x(s)]ds+ Z(s, t)B1(s)Et[u(s)]ds
− Z(s, t)B2(s)
[
R̂2(s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)D2(s)
]−1
×
[
B⊤2 (s)P̂ (s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)C(s)
]
Et[x(s)]ds
− Z(s, t)B2(s)
[
R̂2(s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)D2(s)
]−1
×
[
B⊤2 (s)Et[h(s)] +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)D1(s)Et[u(s)]
+D⊤2 (s)Et[l(s)]
]
ds+ k(s, t)ds+ l(s)dB(s).
We compare the coefficients in the above two equalities.
Then we can easily show that P and Z have to satisfy the
following nonsymmetric coupled Riccati differential equations
(RDEs):
−dP (s,t)ds = A
⊤(s)P (s, t) + P (s, t)A(s)
+Q2(s, t) + C
⊤(s)P (s, t)C(s)
−
[
P (s, t)B2(s) + C
⊤(s)P (s, t)D2(s)
]
×
[
R̂2(s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)D2(s)
]−1
×
[
B⊤2 (s)P̂ (s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)C(s)
]
, s ∈ [t, T ]
−dZ(s,t)ds = A
⊤(s)Z(s, t) + Z(s, t)A(s) + Q¯2(s)
−Z(s, t)B2(s)
[
R̂2(s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)D2(s)
]−1
×
[
B⊤2 (s)P̂ (s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)C(s)
]
, s ∈ [t, T ]
P (T, t) = M2(t), Z(T, t) = M¯2(t)
P̂ (s, t) = P (s, t) + Z(s, t),
(17)
which implies (see the notation defined in (A.1))
−dP̂(s,t)ds = A
⊤(s)P̂ (s, t) + P̂ (s, t)A(s)
+Q̂2(s, t) + C
⊤(s)P (s, t) + C(s)
−
[
P̂ (s, t)B2(s) + C
⊤(s)P (s, t)D2(s)
]
×
[
R̂2(s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)D2(s)
]−1
×
[
B⊤2 (s)P̂ (s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)C(s)
]
P̂ (T, t) = M̂2(t), s ∈ [t, T ].
(18)
Hence, by substituting (15) into the SDE in (1), with
the notation defined in (A.1) of Appendix A, we have the
following FBSDE that is equivalent to the FBSDE in (11)
through the optimality condition in (9) and the transformation
in (12) (note that ∗ notation is dropped in x):
dx(s) =
[
H(s)x(s) + F (s)u(s)−G1(s)h(s)
−G2(s)l(s)
]
ds+
[
H¯(s)x(s) + F¯ (s)u(s)
−G¯1(s)h(s)− G¯2(s)l(s)
]
dB(s), s ∈ [t, T ]
dh(s) =
[
−H˜⊤(s, t)h(s)− F˜⊤(s, t)l(s)
−K⊤1 (s, t)u(s)−K
⊤
2 (s, t)Et[u(s)]
+K¯⊤1 (s, t)Et[h(s)] + K¯
⊤
2 (s, t)Et[l(s)]
]
ds
+l(s)dB(s), s ∈ [t, T ]
x(t) = x0, h(T ) = 0,
(19)
where the notation is defined in (A.1) of Appendix A. Note
that (h, l) ∈ L2
F
([0, T ]× [0, T ],Rn) × L2
F
([0, T ]× [0, T ],Rn)
is the BSDE. In fact, the FBSDE in (19) is the follower’s
rational behavior with respect to his equilibrium control under
an arbitrary control of the leader. Note that x in (19) depends
on an arbitrary control of the leader, i.e., x = x∗ = xu,α[u,x0],
as in Definition 2(i). This is the optimization constraint of the
leader’s equilibrium control problem in Section IV.
In summary, we have the following result:
Theorem 1: Consider Problem LQ-FEC with (4). Suppose
that the coupled RDEs in (17) admit unique solutions, which
are continuous in both variables. Then Problem LQ-FEC is
solvable, and v∗ given in (15) is the state feedback represen-
tation of the (open-loop) equilibrium control of the follower,
and x in (19) is the corresponding equilibrium state process.
7IV. LEADER’S EQUILIBRIUM CONTROL
This section considers the leader’s equilibrium control prob-
lem in the sense of Definition 2(ii). In the leader’s problem,
the objective functional is given in (2) with v replaced by
v∗ in (15) and the FBSDE in (19) is the corresponding
optimization constraint (see Definition 2(ii)). As mentioned in
Section III, (19) is the rational behavior of the follower with
(15). The leader’s problem is denoted by Problem LQ-LEC
(LQ leader’s equilibrium control problem).
The following result states the leader’s equilibrium control
and the associated equilibrium state process in view of Defi-
nition 2(ii).
Theorem 2: Consider Problem LQ-LEC with (4). Assume
that the assumptions in Theorem 1 hold. Suppose that the pair
(x∗, u∗) ∈ SF([t, T ],R
n)× U [t, T ] is the state-control pair of
the leader with x∗(t) = x0. Consider the following FBSDE:
dφ(s, t) =
[
H˜(s, t)φ(s, t) − K¯1(s, t)Et[φ(s, t)]
+G⊤1 (s)y(s, t) + G¯
⊤
1 (s)z(s, t)
]
ds
+
[
F˜ (s, t)φ(s)− K¯2(s, t)Et[φ(s, t)] +G
⊤
2 (s)y(s, t)
+G¯⊤2 (s)z(s, t)
]
dB(s), s ∈ [t, T ]
dy(s, t) = −
[
H⊤(s)y(s, t) + H¯⊤(s)z(s, t)
+Q1(s, t)x
∗(s) + Q¯1(s, t)Et[x
∗(s)]
]
ds
+z(s, t)dB(s), s ∈ [t, T ]
φ(t, t) = 0
y(T, t) = M1(t)x
∗(T ) + M¯1(t)Et[x
∗(T )].
(20)
Suppose that (φ, y, z) ∈ L2
F
([0, T ]× [0, T ],Rn)×L2
F
([0, T ]×
[0, T ],Rn) × L2
F
([0, T ] × [0, T ],Rn) is the solution to the
FBSDE in (20), which is continuous in both s ∈ [t, T ] and
t ∈ [0, T ]. Then the corresponding (open-loop) equilibrium
control of the leader satisfies for t ∈ [0, T ],
F⊤(t)y(t, t) + F¯⊤(t)z(t, t) + R̂1(t, t)u
∗(t) = 0, (21)
where R̂1(s, t) = R1(s, t) + R¯1(s, t). In particular, for t ∈
[0, T ], we have
u∗(t) = −R̂−11 (t, t)(F
⊤(t)y(t, t) + F¯⊤(t)z(t, t)). (22)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B. 
Unlike the follower’s case, due to the FBSDE constraint in
the leader’s problem, it is not clear that (21) is the necessary
and sufficient condition for the leader’s equilibrium control.
Hence, the uniqueness of the leader’s equilibrium control is
not known yet.
Let (note that ∗ notation is dropped in x)
X(s) =
[
x(s)
φ(s, t)
]
, Y (s, t) =
[
y(s, t)
h(s)
]
, L(s, t) =
[
z(s, t)
l(s)
]
.
Note that X(t) =
[
x⊤0 0
]⊤
in view of the initial condition
in (20). Then with the notation defined in (A.2) of Appendix
A, the FBSDEs in (19) and (20) can be written as
dX(s) =
[
A1(s, t)X(s) +A2(s, t)Et[X(s)]
+B(s)u∗(s) + C(s)Y (s, t) +D(s)L(s, t)
]
ds
+
[
A¯1(s, t)X(s) + A¯2(s, t)Et[X(s)] + B¯(s)u(s)
+C¯(s)Y (s, t) + D¯(s)L(s, t)
]
dB(s), s ∈ [t, T ]
dY (s, t) = −
[
A⊤1 (s, t)Y (s, t) + A¯
⊤
1 (s, t)L(s, t)
+A⊤2 (s, t)Et[Y (s, t)] + A¯
⊤
2 (s, t)Et[L(s, t)]
+Q(s, t)X(s) + Q¯(s, t)Et[X(s)]
+G⊤(s, t)u∗(s) + G¯⊤(s, t)Et[u
∗(s)]
]
ds
+L(s, t)dB(s), s ∈ [t, T ]
X(t) = X0
Y (T, t) =
[
M1(t)x(T ) + M¯1(t)Et[x(T )]
0
]
,
(23)
and the optimality condition in (21) is equivalent to
B⊤(t)Y (t, t) + B¯⊤(t)L(t, t) + R̂(t, t)u∗(t) = 0, (24)
for t ∈ [0, T ], where R̂(s, t) = R̂1(s, t) = R1(s, t) + R¯1(s, t)
(see the notation defined in (A.2) of Appendix A).
We now obtain the state feedback representation of the
equilibrium control of the leader via the generalized Four-
Step Scheme and the coupled RDEs. Consider the following
transformation:
Y (s, t) = P(s, t)X(s) + Z(s, t)Et[X(s)], s ∈ [t, T ], (25)
where P and Z are coupled RDEs with P ,Z : [0, T ] ×
[0, T ] → R2n×2n, and their explicit expressions will be
determined later. Unlike the follower’s case in (12), there is
no additional BSDE term in (25). Also, P and Z are 2n× 2n
dimensional due to the augmented state space X , Y and L.
From (25), we have P(T, t) = M(t) and Z(T, t) = M¯(t).
Let P̂(s, t) = P(s, t) + Z(s, t).
By using Itoˆ’s formula, (note Â1(s, t) = A1(s, t)+A2(s, t))
dY (s, t) = −
[
A⊤1 (s, t)Y (s, t) + A¯
⊤
1 (s, t)L(s, t) (26)
+A⊤2 (s, t)Et[Y (s, t)] + A¯
⊤
2 (s, t)Et[L(s, t)]
+Q(s, t)X(s) + Q¯(s, t)Et[X(s)]
+ G⊤(s, t)u∗(s) + G¯⊤(s, t)Et[u
∗(s)]
]
ds+ L(s, t)dB(s)
=
dP(s, t)
ds
X(s)ds+
dZ(s, t)
ds
Et[X(s)]ds
+ P(s, t)
[
A1(s, t)X(s) +A2(s, t)Et[X(s)]
+ B(s)u∗(s) + C(s)Y (s, t) +D(s)L(s, t)
]
ds+ P(s, t)
×
[
A¯1(s, t)X(s) + A¯2(s, t)Et[X(s)] + B¯(s)u
∗(s)
+ C¯(s)Y (s, t) + D¯(s)L(s, t)
]
dB(s)
+ Z(s, t)
[
Â1(s, t)Et[X(s)] + B(s)Et[u
∗(s)]
+ C(s)Et[Y (s, t)] +D(s)Et[L(s, t)]
]
ds.
8Then we can easily see that L(s, t) = P(s, t)
[
A¯1(s, t)X(s)+
A¯2(s, t)Et[X(s)] + B¯(s)u
∗(s) + C¯(s)P(s, t)X(s) +
C¯(s)Z(s, t)Et[X(s)]+ D¯(s)L(s, t)
]
, which, together with the
existence of [I − P(s, t)D¯(s)]−1, implies
L(s, t) =
[
I − P(s, t)D¯(s)
]−1
P(s, t) (27)
×
[
A¯1(s, t)X(s) + A¯2(s, t)Et[X(s)] + B¯(s)u
∗(s)
+ C¯(s)P(s, t)X(s) + C¯(s)Z(s, t)Et[X(s)]
]
.
By substituting (25) and (27) into the optimality condition
in (24) (note P̂(s, t) = P(s, t) + Z(s, t) and Â2(s, t) =
A¯1(s, t) + A¯2(s, t); see also the notation defined in (A.2))
B⊤(t)P̂(t, t)X(t) + R̂(t, t)u∗(t)
+ B¯⊤(t)
[
I − P(t, t)D¯(t)
]−1
P(t, t)
×
[
Â2(t, t)X(t) + B¯(t)u
∗(t) + C¯(t)P̂(t, t)X(t)
]
= 0,
which implies
u∗(t) = −
[
R̂(t, t) + B¯⊤(t)
[
I − P(t, t)D¯(t)
]−1
P(t, t)B¯(t)
]−1
×
[
B⊤(t)P̂(t, t) + B¯⊤(t)
[
I − P(t, t)D¯(t)
]−1
× P(t, t)(Â2(t, t) + C¯(t)P̂(t, t))
]
X(t), (28)
where for t ∈ [0, T ], we denote
u∗(t) = −Π(t, t)X(t) = −Π¯(t, t)x(t). (29)
Note that Π is m1 × 2n, and Π¯ is m1 × n. The last equality
of (29) follows from the definition of X and its initial con-
dition. Note that (28) (equivalently (29)) is the state feedback
representation of the leader’s equilibrium control in (22) that
is obtained by the transformations in (25) and (27).
From (29) and (27), we have
L(s, t) =
[
I − P(s, t)D¯(s)
]−1
P(s, t)
[
A¯1(s, t)X(s) (30)
+ A¯2(s, t)Et[X(s)]− B¯(s)Π(s, s)X(s)
+ C¯(s)P(s, t)X(s) + C¯(s)Z(s, t)Et[X(s)]
]
.
Substituting (25), (29) and (30) into X in (23) yields
dX(s) =
[
A1(s, t)X(s) +A2(s, t)Et[X(s)]
−B(s)Π(s, s)X(s) + C(s)P(s, t)X(s)
+C(s)Z(s, t)Et[X(s)]
+D(s)
[
I − P(s, t)D¯(s)
]−1
×P(s, t)
[
A¯1(s, t)X(s) + A¯2(s, t)Et[X(s)]
−B¯(s)Π(s, s)X(s) + C¯(s)P(s, t)X(s)
+C¯(s)Z(s, t)Et[X(s)]
]]
ds
+
[
A¯1(s, t)X(s) + A¯2(s, t)Et[X(s)]
−B¯(s)Π(s, s)X(s) + C¯(s)P(s, t)X(s)
+C¯(s)Z(s, t)Et[X(s)]
+D¯(s)
[
I − P(s, t)D¯(s)
]−1
×P(s, t)
[
A¯1(s, t)X(s) + A¯2(s, t)Et[X(s)]
−B¯(s)Π(s, s)X(s) + C¯(s)P(s, t)X(s)
+C¯(s)Z(s, t)Et[X(s)]
]]
dB(s), s ∈ [t, T ]
X(t) = X0.
(31)
By substituting (25), (29) and (30) into (26), we have
dY (s, t) = −
[
A⊤1 (s, t)P(s, t)X(s) +A
⊤
1 (s, t)
×Z(s, t)Et[X(s)] + A¯
⊤
1 (s, t)
[
I − P(s, t)D¯(s)
]−1
× P(s, t)
[
A¯1(s, t)X(s) + A¯2(s, t)Et[X(s)]
− B¯(s)Π(s, s)X(s) + C¯(s)P(s, t)X(s)
+ C¯(s)Z(s, t)Et[X(s)]
]
+A⊤2 (s, t)P̂(s, t)Et[X(s, t)]
+ A¯⊤2 (s, t)
[
I − P(s, t)D¯(s)
]−1
P(s, t)
[
Â2(s, t)
+ C¯(s)P̂(s, t)− B¯(s)Π(s, s)
]
Et[X(s)] +Q(s, t)X(s)
+ Q¯(s, t)Et[X(s)]− G
⊤(s, t)Π(s, s)
− G¯⊤(s, t)Π(s, s)Et[X(s)]
]
ds+ L(s, t)dB(s),
and
dY (s, t) =
dP(s, t)
ds
X(s)ds+
dZ(s, t)
ds
Et[X(s)]ds
+ P(s, t)dX(s) + Z(s, t)dEt[X(s)],
where the expressions of dX(s) and dEt[X(s)] can be ob-
tained from (31).
We compare the coefficients in the above two equalities.
Then we can easily show that P and Z have to satisfy the
following nonsymmetric coupled RDEs:
−dP(s,t)ds = Λ1(s, t,P(s, t),Z(s, t)), s ∈ [t, T ]
−dZ(s,t)ds = Λ2(s, t,P(s, t),Z(s, t)), s ∈ [t, T ]
P(T, t) =M(t), Z(T, t) = M¯(t)
det
(
I − P(s, t)D¯(s)
)
6= 0
det
(
R̂(t, t) + B¯⊤(t)
[
I − P(t, t)D¯(t)
]−1
P(t, t)B¯(t)
)
6= 0
P̂(s, t) = P(s, t) + Z(s, t),
(32)
where the explicit expressions of Λ1 and Λ2 are provided
in Appendix C. In (32), P̂(s, t) = P(s, t) + Z(s, t) satis-
fies −dP̂(s,t)ds = Λ3(s, t,P(s, t),Z(s, t)), s ∈ [t, T ], with
P̂(T, t) = M(t) + M¯(t) given (C.3) in Appendix C. Note
that in (32), the two nonsingularity conditions are included
due to the invertibility of the matrices in (30) and (28).
By substituting u∗ in (29) (equivalently (28)) into the
leader’s optimization constraint x in (19)9 (equivalently (23)),
we have (note that ∗ notation is dropped in x):
dx(s) =
[
Ψ(s)x(s)−G1(s)h(s)−G2(s)l(s)
]
ds
+
[
Ψ¯(s)x(s) − G¯1(s)h(s)− G¯2(s)l(s)
]
dB(s)
x(t) = x0, s ∈ [t, T ],
(33)
where Ψ(s) = H(s) − F (s)Π¯(s, s), Ψ¯(s) = H¯(s) −
F¯ (s)Π¯(s, s), and (h, l) is given in (19) (see also (23)). Note
that (33) is the leader’s equilibrium state process, where
(29) (equivalently in (28)) is the corresponding the leader’s
equilibrium control in view of Definition 2(ii).
In summary, we have the following result:
9As mentioned at the beginning of Section IV, (19) is the rational behavior
of the follower with respect to his equilibrium control in (15).
9Theorem 3: Consider Problem LQ-LEC with (4). Suppose
that the assumptions in Theorem 1 hold. Assume that the
coupled RDEs in (32) admit unique solutions, which are
continuous in both variables. Then Problem LQ-LEC is
solvable, and u∗ ∈ U [t, T ] given in (29) (equivalently in
(28)) is the state feedback representation of the (open-loop)
equilibrium control of the leader, where x in (33) is the
corresponding equilibrium state process.
In view of Theorems 1 and 3, we now state the existence
of the time-consistent Stackelberg equilibrium of Problem
LQ-TI-MF-SDG (see Definition 2(iii)).
Corollary 1: Consider Problem LQ-TI-MF-SDG of the
paper with (4). Assume that the assumptions in Theorems
1 and 3 hold. Let u∗ be given in (29) (equivalently (28)),
and v∗ given in (15) with u replaced by u∗ in (29), i.e.,
v∗ = α[u∗, x0] ∈ V [t, T ]. Then (u
∗, v∗) ∈ U [t, T ] × V [t, T ]
constitutes the (adapted open-loop) time-consistent Stackel-
berg equilibrium of Problem LQ-TI-MF-SDG, and (33) is
the corresponding equilibrium state process.
In view of Theorems 1 and 3 (and Corollary 1), the
solvability (existence and uniqueness of the solution) of the
nonsymmetric coupled RDEs of the follower (17) and the
leader (32) is crucial to characterize the time-consistent Stack-
elberg equilibrium. However, their general solvability problem
requires a different approach than that for the RDEs in various
classes of (time-consistent) LQ optimal control and differential
games, since (17) and (32) have two time variables and the
cost parameters could be general nonexponential discounting
depending on the initial time. Such coupled RDEs have not
been studied in the existing literature, which we will address in
the future. Note that the solvability of (17) and (32) is verified
numerically in Section V for the time-inconsistent resource-
allocation Stackelberg game.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
As mentioned, it is necessary to check the solvability of
the nonsymmetric coupled RDEs of the follower (17) and
the leader (32) to characterize the time-consistent Stackelberg
equilibrium. This section provides the numerical examples to
check their solvability.
We consider the modified resource-allocation Stackelberg
game considered in [46], [50], where unlike [50] the time-
inconsistent problem is formulated. Specifically, the condi-
tional expectations (mean-field variables) are included in the
objective functionals, and the nonexponential discounting is
hyperbolic similar to [18]. We consider two different cases:
Case I t = 0.1, T = 2.2, A = −1.6, B1 = −0.3, B2 =
1, C = 0.5, D1 = D2 = 0, Q¯1 = Q¯2 = 2, R¯1 =
R¯2 = 0, R1(s, t) = (1 + 0.7(s − t))
−1.8, R2(s, t) =
(1 + 0.2(s − t))−0.3, Q1(s, t) = (5 + 1.2(s − t))
−1.2,
Q2(s, t) = (10+0.8(s−t))
−0.5,M1(t) = M¯1(t) = 1.3t
2,
M2(t) = M¯2(t) = 2.1t
2;
Case II t = 0.1, T = 1.6, A = −1.6, B1 = −0.3, B2 =
1, C = 0.5, D1 = 0.7, D2 = 0.2, Q1(s, t) = (5 +
1.2(s− t))−1.2, R1(s, t) = (1+0.7(s− t))
−1.8, Q¯1 = 2,
R¯1(s, t) = (20+3.7(s−t))
−0.1, Q2(s, t) = (10+0.8(s−
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Figure 1. The evolutions of the nonsymmetric coupled RDEs of the follower
and the leader for Case I (top: follower, bottom: leader).
t))−0.5, R2(s, t) = (1 + 0.2(s − t))
−0.3, Q¯2 = (0.7 +
3.1(s − t))−1.3, R¯2 = 25, M1(t) = M¯1(t) = 1.3t
2,
M2(t) = M¯2(t) = 2.1t
2.
Note the hyperbolic cost parameters, Ri, R¯i, Qi, Q¯i, Mi and
M¯i, in Case I and Case II. It can be seen that Case II is more
general in that we consider the controlled diffusion term due to
nonzero D1 and D2, and that the inclusion of the conditional
expectation of the controls in the objective functionals. Note
that with Case I and Case II, (4) holds. Using the Euler’s
method (see [55]), we obtain the plots of the evolutions of
the nonsymmetric coupled RDEs of (17) and (32) for Cases I
and II, which are depicted in Figs. 1 and 2. These simulation
results show that the solutions of the coupled RDEs are well
defined and do not have a finite escape time [5]. This implies
that in view of Theorems 1 and 3, and Corollary 1, the time-
consistent Stackelberg equilibrium for the time-inconsistent
resource-allocation problem with Case I and Case II exists,
which can be characterized by substituting the parameters in
the corresponding case into u∗ in (29) (equivalently (28)) and
v∗ in (15) with u replaced by u∗ in (29).
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Figure 2. The evolutions of the nonsymmetric coupled RDEs of the follower
and the leader for Case II (top: follower, bottom: leader).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered the linear-quadratic (LQ)
time-inconsistent mean-field Stackelberg differential game
(Problem LQ-TI-MF-SDG). The (time-consistent) equilib-
rium control of the follower and its state feedback represen-
tation in terms of the nonsymmetric coupled RDEs and the
BSDE have been obtained. The equilibrium state process of
the follower is the FBSDE that captures his rational behavior.
Then the leader’s (time-consistent) equilibrium control has
been obtained via the variational method under the constraint
of the follower’s rational behavior (the FBSDE). The state
feedback representation of the leader’s equilibrium control
in terms of the nonsymmetric coupled RDEs has been char-
acterized via the generalized decoupling method. Under the
solvability of the nonsymmetric coupled RDEs of the leader
and the follower, the equilibrium controls of the leader and the
follower constitute the time-consistent Stackelberg equilibrium
of Problem LQ-TI-MF-SDG. A future research topic is
to consider the discrete-time time-inconsistent leader-follower
Stackelberg game that can be viewed as an extension of [30].
Another topic would be the existence and uniqueness of the
solution to (17) and (32) and their numerical computation
approaches. Note that under some assumptions on the coeffi-
cients in (17) and (32), the Picard fixed point argument can
be used to obtain both existence and uniqueness.
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APPENDIX A
NOTATIONS FOR SECTIONS III AND IV
The following notation is used in Section III:
S(s, s) = [R̂2(s, s) +D
⊤
2 (s)P (s, s)D2(t)
]
H(s) = A(s)−B2(s)S
−1(s, s)
×
[
B⊤2 (s)P̂ (s, s) +D
⊤
2 (t)P (s, s)C(s)
]
H¯(s) = C(s)−D2(s)S
−1(s, s)
×
[
B⊤2 (s)P̂ (s, s) +D
⊤
2 (t)P (s, s)C(s)
]
H˜(s, t) = A(s)−B2(s)(S
−1(s, s))⊤
×
[
B⊤2 (s)P
⊤(s, t) +D⊤2 (s)P
⊤(s, t)C(s)
]
F (s) = B1(s)−B2(s)S
−1(s, s)D⊤2 (s)P (s, s)D1(s)
F¯ (s) = D1(s)−D2(s)S
−1(s, s)D⊤2 (s)P (s, s)D1(s)
F˜ (s, t) = C(s)−D2(s)(S
−1(s, s))⊤
×
[
B⊤2 (s)P
⊤(s, t) +D⊤2 (s)P
⊤(s, t)C(s)
]
G1(s) = B2(s)S
−1(s, s)B⊤2 (s)
G2(s) = B2(s)S
−1(s, s)D⊤2 (s) = G¯
⊤
1 (s)
G¯2(s) = D2(s)S
−1(s, s)D⊤2 (s)
K1(s, t) = D
⊤
1 (s)P
⊤(s, t)C(s) +B⊤1 (s)P
⊤(s, t)
−D⊤1 (s)P
⊤(s, s)D2(s)(S
−1(s, s))⊤
×
[
B⊤2 (s)P
⊤(s, t) +D⊤2 (s)P
⊤(s, t)C(s)
]
K2(s, t) = B
⊤
1 (s)Z
⊤(s, t)−D⊤1 (s)P
⊤(s, s)D2(s)
× (S−1(s, s))⊤B⊤2 (s)Z
⊤(s, t)
K¯1(s, t) = B2(s)(S
−1(s, s))⊤(s, s)B⊤2 (s)Z
⊤(s, t)
K¯2(s, t) = D2(s)(S
−1(s, s))⊤B⊤2 (s)Z
⊤(s, t)
R̂2(s, t) = R2(s, t) + R¯2(s, t)
M̂2(t) = M2(t) + M¯2(t)
Q̂2(s, t) = Q2(s, t) + Q¯2(s, t)
P̂ (s, t) = P (s, t) + Z(s, t).
(A.1)
The following notation is used in Section IV:
A1(s, t) =
[
H(s) 0
0 H˜(s, t)
]
A¯1(s, t) =
[
H¯(s) 0
0 F˜ (s, t)
]
A2(s, t) =
[
0 0
0 −K¯1(s, t)
]
A¯2(s, t) =
[
0 0
0 −K¯2(s, t)
]
B(s) =
[
F (s)
0
]
, B¯(s) =
[
F¯ (s)
0
]
C(s) =
[
0 −G1(s)
G⊤1 (s) 0
]
C¯(s) =
[
0 −G¯1(s)
G⊤2 (s) 0
]
D(s) =
[
0 −G2(s)
G¯⊤1 (s) 0
]
D¯(s) =
[
0 −G¯2(s)
G¯⊤2 (s) 0
]
Q(s, t) =
[
Q1(s, t) 0
0 0
]
, Q¯(s, t) =
[
Q¯1(s, t) 0
0 0
]
G(s, t) =
[
0 K1(s, t)
]
, G¯(s, t) =
[
0 K2(s, t)
]
M(s) =
[
M1(s) 0
0 0
]
, M¯(s) =
[
M¯1(s) 0
0 0
]
X0 =
[
x0
0
]
R̂(s, t) = R̂1(s, t) = R1(s, t) + R¯1(s, t)
Â1(s, t) = A1(s, t) +A2(s, t)
Â2(s, t) = A¯1(s, t) + A¯2(s, t).
(A.2)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
This appendix provides the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2: Let u∗ be given in (22), and the triplet
(x∗, h∗, l∗) be the FBSDE in (19) generated by u∗ (that can be
obtained by substituting (22) into (19)).10 For any s ∈ [t, T ),
let uǫ be the control defined in (6), and the triplet (xǫ, hǫ, lǫ)
be the FBSDE in (19) generated by uǫ, i.e.,
dxǫ(s) =
[
H(s)xǫ(s) + F (s)uǫ(s)−G1(s)h
ǫ(s)
−G2(s)l
ǫ(s)
]
ds+
[
H¯(s)xǫ(s) + F¯ (s)uǫ(s)
−G¯1(s)h
ǫ(s)− G¯2(s)l
ǫ(s)
]
dB(s), s ∈ [t, T ]
dhǫ(s) =
[
−H˜⊤(s, t)hǫ(s)− F˜⊤(s, t)lǫ(s)
−K⊤1 (s, t)u
ǫ(s)−K⊤2 (s, t)Et[u
ǫ(s)]
+K¯⊤1 (s, t)Et[h
ǫ(s)] + K¯⊤2 (s, t)Et[l
ǫ(s)]
]
ds
+lǫ(s)dB(s), s ∈ [t, T ]
xǫ(t) = x0, h(T ) = 0.
Let δx = x∗ − xǫ δh = h∗ − hǫ, and δl = l∗ − lǫ. Note that
δx(t) = 0 and δh(T ) = 0.
10Note that in (19), ∗ notation is dropped in x
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By using Itoˆ’s formula, we have
d〈δx(s), y(s, t)〉
= 〈F (s)(uǫ(s)− u∗(s))
−G1(s)δh(s)−G2(s)δl(s), y(s, t)〉ds
+ 〈F¯ (s)(uǫ(s)− u∗(s))
− G¯1(s)δh(s)− G¯2(s)δl(s), z(s, t)〉ds
+ 〈δx(s),−Q1(s, t)x
∗(s)− Q¯1(s, t)Et[x
∗(s)]〉ds
+ 〈H¯(s)δx(s) + F¯ (s)(uǫ(s)− u∗(s))− G¯1(s)δh(s)
− G¯2(s)δl(s), y(s, t)〉dB(s) + 〈δx(s), z(s, t)〉dB(s),
and
d〈δh(s), φ(s, t)〉
= 〈−H˜⊤(s, t)δh(s)− F˜⊤(s, t)δl(s)
−K⊤1 (s, t)(u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s))
−K⊤2 (s, t)Et[u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s)]
+ K¯⊤1 (s, t)Et[δh(s)] + K¯
⊤
2 (s, t)Et[δl(s)], φ(s, t)〉ds
+ 〈δh(s), H˜(s, t)φ(s, t)− K¯1(s, t)Et[φ(s, t)]
+G⊤1 (s)y(s, t) + G¯
⊤
1 (s)z(s, t)〉ds
+ 〈δl(s), F˜ (s, t)φ(s, t) − K¯2(s, t)Et[φ(s, t)]
+G⊤2 (s)y(s, t) + G¯
⊤
2 (s)z(s, t)〉ds
+ 〈δh(s), F˜ (s, t)φ(s, t) − K¯2(s, t)Et[φ(s, t)]
+G⊤2 (s)y(s, t) + G¯
⊤
2 (s)z(s, t)〉dB(s)
+ 〈δl(s), φ(s, t)〉dB(s).
In view of initial and terminal conditions of (20), we have
Et
[
〈δx(T ),M1(t)x
∗(T ) + M¯1(t)Et[x
∗(T )]〉
]
= Et
∫ T
t
[
〈F (s)(uǫ(s)− u∗(s))−G1(s)δh(s)
−G2(s)δl(s), y(s, t)〉+ 〈F¯ (s)(u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s))
− G¯1(s)δh(s) − G¯2(s)δl(s), z(s, t)〉
+ 〈δx(s),−Q1(s, t)x
∗(s)− Q¯1(s, t)Et[x
∗(s)]〉
]
ds,
and
0 = Et
∫ T
t
[
〈−H˜⊤(s, t)δh(s)− F˜⊤(s, t)δl(s)
−K⊤1 (s, t)(u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s))
−K⊤2 (s, t)Et[u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s)]
+ K¯⊤1 (s, t)Et[δh(s)]
+ K¯⊤2 (s, t)Et[δl(s)], φ(s, t)〉
+ 〈δh(s), H˜(s, t)φ(s, t) − K¯1(s, t)Et[φ(s, t)]
+G⊤1 (s)y(s, t) + G¯
⊤
1 (s)z(s, t)〉
+ 〈δl(s), F˜ (s, t)φ(s, t)− K¯2(s, t)Et[φ(s, t)]
+G⊤2 (s)y(s, t) + G¯
⊤
2 (s)z(s, t)〉
]
ds
= Et
∫ T
t
[
〈−K⊤1 (s, t)(u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s))
−K⊤2 (s, t)Et[u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s)], φ(s, t)〉
+ 〈δh(s), G⊤1 (s)y(s, t) + G¯
⊤
1 (s)z(s, t)〉
+ 〈δl(s), G⊤2 (s)y(s, t) + G¯
⊤
2 (s)z(s, t)〉
]
ds,
which implies
Et
[
〈δx(T ),M1(t)x
∗(T ) + M¯1(t)Et[x
∗(T )]〉
]
(B.1)
= Et
∫ T
t
[
〈F (s)(uǫ(s)− u∗(s)), y(s, t)〉
+ 〈F¯ (s)(uǫ(s)− u∗(s)), z(s, t)〉
+ 〈−K⊤1 (s, t)(u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s))
−K⊤2 (s, t)Et[u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s)], φ(s, t)〉
+ 〈δx(s),−Q1(s, t)x
∗(s)− Q¯1(s, t)Et[x
∗(s)]〉
]
ds.
On the other hand, for the objective functional of the leader
in (2), we have
J1(t, x0;u
ǫ, α[uǫ, x0])− J1(t, x0;u
∗, α[u∗, x0])
= Et
[∫ T
t
[
〈xǫ(s) + x∗(s), Q1(s, t)δx(s)〉
+ 〈Et[x
ǫ(s) + x∗(s)], Q¯1(s, t)Et[δx(s)]〉
+ 〈uǫ(s) + u∗(s), R1(s, t)(u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s))〉
+ 〈Et[u
ǫ(s) + u∗(s)], R¯1(s, t)Et[u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s)]〉
]
ds
+ 〈xǫ(T ) + x∗(T ),M1(t)δx(T )〉
+ 〈Et[x
ǫ(T ) + x∗(T )], M¯1(t)Et[δx(T )]〉
]
.
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Hence, with (B.1), we have
J1(t, x0;u
ǫ, α[uǫ, x0])− J1(t, x0;u
∗, α[u∗, x0]) (B.2)
= Et
[∫ T
t
[
〈xǫ(s) + x∗(s), Q1(s, t)δx(s)〉
+ 〈Et[x
ǫ(s) + x∗(s)], Q¯1(s, t)Et[δx(s)]〉
+ 〈uǫ(s) + u∗(s), R1(s, t)(u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s))〉
+ 〈Et[u
ǫ(s) + u∗(s)], R¯1(s, t)Et[u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s)]〉
]
ds
+ 〈xǫ(T ) + x∗(T ),M1(t)δx(T )〉
+ 〈Et[x
ǫ(T ) + x∗(T )], M¯1(t)Et[δx(T )]〉
]
+ 2Et
∫ T
t
[
〈F (s)(uǫ(s)− u∗(s)), y(s, t)〉
+ 〈F¯ (s)(uǫ(s)− u∗(s)), z(s, t)〉
+ 〈−K⊤1 (s, t)(u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s))
−K⊤2 (s, t)Et[u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s)], φ(s, t)〉
+ 〈δx(s),−Q1(s, t)x
∗(s)− Q¯1(s, t)Et[x
∗(s)]〉
]
ds
− 2Et
[
〈δx(T ),M1(t)x
∗(T ) + M¯1(t)Et[x
∗(T )]〉
]
= Et
[∫ T
t
[
〈Q1(s, t)(x
ǫ(s) + x∗(s)), δx(s)〉
+ 〈−2Q1(s, t)x
∗(s), δx(s)〉
+ 〈Q¯1(s, t)Et[x
ǫ(s) + x∗(s)], δx(s)〉
+ 〈−2Q¯1(s, t)Et[x
∗(s)], δx(s)〉
+ 〈R1(s, t)(u
ǫ(s) + u∗(s)), uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉
+ 〈R¯1(s, t)Et[u
ǫ(s) + u∗(s)], uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉
+ 2〈F⊤(s)y(s, t) + F¯⊤(s)z(s, t), uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉
+ 2〈−K1(s, t)φ(s, t) −K2(s, t)Et[φ(s, t)],
uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉
]
ds
+ 〈M1(t)(x
ǫ(T ) + x∗(T )), δx(T )〉
+ 〈M¯1(t)Et[x
ǫ(T ) + x∗(T )], δx(T )〉
− 2〈M1(t)x
∗(T ) + M¯1(t)Et[x
∗(T )], δx(s)〉
]
.
Then with Q̂1(s, t) = Q1(s, t) + Q¯1(s, t) and M̂1(s, t) =
M1(s, t)+ M¯1(s, t) and due to the definition of the perturbed
control in (6), (B.2) can be rewritten as
J1(t, x0;u
ǫ, α[uǫ, x0])− J1(t, x0;u
∗, α[u∗, x0]) (B.3)
= Et
[∫ T
t
[
|δx(s)− Et[δx(s)]|
2
Q1(s,t)
+ |Et[δx(s)]|
2
Q̂1(s,t)
]
ds+ |Et[δx(T )]|
2
M̂1(t)
+ |δx(T )− Et[δx(T )]|
2
M1(t)
+
∫ t+ǫ
t
[
〈R1(s, t)(u
ǫ(s) + u∗(s)), uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉
+ 〈R¯1(s, t)Et[u
ǫ(s) + u∗(s)], uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉
+ 2〈F⊤(s)y(s, t) + F¯⊤(s)z(s, t), uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉
+ 2〈−K1(s, t)φ(s, t) −K2(s, t)Et[φ(s, t)],
uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉
]
ds
]
.
Note that
Et
[
〈R1(s, t)(u
ǫ(s) + u∗(s)), uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉 (B.4)
+ 〈R¯1(s, t)Et[u
ǫ(s) + u∗(s)], uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉
+ 2〈F⊤(s)y(s, t) + F¯⊤(s)z(s, t), uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉
+ 2〈−K1(s, t)φ(s, t)−K2(s, t)Et[φ(s, t)],
uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉
]
= Et
[
〈R1(s, t)(u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s)), uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉
+ 〈R¯1(s, t)Et[u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s)], uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉
+ 2〈R1(s, t)u
∗(s) + R¯1(s, t)Et[u
∗(s)],
uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉
+ 2〈F⊤(s)y(s, t) + F¯⊤(s)z(s, t), uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉
+ 2〈−K1(s, t)φ(s, t)−K2(s, t)Et[φ(s, t)],
uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉
]
= Et
[
|(uǫ(s)− u∗(s))− Et[u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s)]|2R1(s,t)
+ |Et[u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s)]|2
R̂1(s,t)
+ 2〈λ(s, t), uǫ(s)− u∗(s)〉
]
,
where
λ(s, t) = R1(s, t)u
∗(s) + R¯1(s, t)Et[u
∗(s)]
+ F⊤(s)y(s, t) + F¯⊤(s)z(s, t)
−K1(s, t)φ(s, t)−K2(s, t)Et[φ(s, t)].
Due to the definition of u∗ in (22), boundedness of the
coefficients, and the continuity of the FBSDEs in (19) and
(20), we have
lim inf
s↓t
E[|λ(s, t)|2] = 0. (B.5)
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Hence, (B.4) can be rewritten as follows:
Et
[
|(uǫ(s)− u∗(s))− Et[u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s)]|2R1(s,t)
+ |Et[u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s)]|2
R̂1(s,t)
+ 2〈λ(s, t), uǫ(s)− u∗(s)− Et[u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s)]
+ Et[u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s)]〉
]
= Et
[∣∣∣R 121 (s, t)(uǫ(s)− u∗(s))
−R
1
2
1 (s, t)Et[u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s)] +R
− 1
2
1 (s, t)λ(s, t)
∣∣∣2
+
∣∣∣R̂ 121 (s, t)Et[uǫ(s)− u∗(s)] + R̂− 121 (s, t)Et[λ(s, t)]∣∣∣2
−
∣∣λ(s, t)∣∣2
R−1
1
(s,t)
−
∣∣Et[λ(s, t)]∣∣2R̂−1
1
(s,t)
]
.
This and (B.3) lead to
J1(t, x0;u
ǫ, α[uǫ, x0])− J1(t, x0;u
∗, α[u∗, x0])
= Et
[∫ T
t
[
|δx(s)− Et[δx(s)]|
2
Q1(s,t)
+ |Et[δx(s)]|
2
Q̂1(s,t)
]
ds+ |Et[δx(T )]|
2
M̂1(t)
+ |δx(T )− Et[δx(T )]|
2
M1(t)
+
∫ t+ǫ
t
[∣∣∣R 121 (s, t)(uǫ(s)− u∗(s))
−R
1
2
1 (s, t)Et[u
ǫ(s)− u∗(s)] +R
− 1
2
1 (s, t)λ(s, t)
∣∣∣2
+
∣∣∣R̂ 121 (s, t)Et[uǫ(s)− u∗(s)] + R̂− 121 (s, t)Et[λ(s, t)]∣∣∣2
−
∣∣λ(s, t)∣∣2
R−1
1
(s,t)
−
∣∣Et[λ(s, t)]∣∣2R̂−1
1
(s,t)
]
ds
]
≥ −Et
∫ t+ǫ
t
[∣∣λ(s, t)∣∣2
R−1
1
(s,t)
+
∣∣Et[λ(s, t)]∣∣2R̂−1
1
(s,t)
]
ds,
which, together with (B.5), implies
lim inf
ǫ↓0
1
ǫ
(
J1(t, x0;u
ǫ, α[uǫ, x0])
− J1(t, x0;u
∗, α[u∗, x0])
)
≥ 0
Hence, in view of Definition 2(ii), we have the desired result.
This completes the proof. 
APPENDIX C
EXPLICIT EXPRESSIONS OF THE NONSYMMETRIC
COUPLED RDES IN (32)
In this appendix, we provide the explicit expressions of
nonsymmetric coupled RDEs in (32).
In (32), we have
−dP(s,t)ds = Λ1(s, t,P(s, t),Z(s, t)), s ∈ [t, T ]
−dZ(s,t)ds = Λ2(s, t,P(s, t),Z(s, t)), s ∈ [t, T ]
P(T, t) =M(t), Z(T, t) = M¯(t)
det
(
I − P(s, t)D¯(s)
)
6= 0
det
(
R̂(t, t) + B¯⊤(t)
[
I − P(t, t)D¯(t)
]−1
P(t, t)B¯(t)
)
6= 0
P̂(s, t) = P(s, t) + Z(s, t),
where
Λ1(s, t,P(s, t),Z(s, t)) (C.1)
= A⊤1 (s)P(s, t) + P(s, t)A1(s) +Q(s, t)
+ P(s, t)C(s)P(s, t) +
[
A¯⊤1 (s, t) + P(s, t)D(s)
]
×
[
I − P(s, t)D¯(s)
]−1
P(s, t)
(
A¯1(s, t)
− B¯(s)
[
R̂(s, s) + B¯⊤(s)
[
I − P(s, s)D¯(s)
]−1
P(s, s)B¯(s)
]−1
×
[
B⊤(s)P̂(s, s) + B¯⊤(s)
[
I − P(s, s)D¯(s)
]−1
× P(s, s)(Â2(s, s) + C¯(s)P̂(s, s))
]
+ C¯(s)P(s, t)
)
−
[
G⊤(s, t) + P(s, t)B(s)
]
×
[
R̂(s, s) + B¯⊤(s)
[
I − P(s, s)D¯(s)
]−1
P(s, s)B¯(s)
]−1
×
[
B⊤(s)P̂(s, s) + B¯⊤(s)
[
I − P(s, s)D¯(s)
]−1
× P(s, s)(Â2(s, s) + C¯(s)P̂(s, s))
]
,
and
Λ2(s, t,P(s, t),Z(s, t)) (C.2)
= A⊤1 (s, t)Z(s, t) +A
⊤
2 (s, t)P̂(s, t) + P(s, t)A2(s, t)
+ Z(s, t)Â1(s, t) + Q¯(s, t)
+ P(s, t)C(s)Z(s, t) + Z(s, t)C(s)P̂(s, t)
+
[
A¯⊤1 (s, t) + P(s, t)D(s)
][
I − P(s, t)D¯(s)
]−1
P(s, t)
×
[
A¯2(s, t) + C¯(s)Z(s, t)
]
+
[
A¯⊤2 (s, t) + Z(s, t)D(s)
][
I − P(s, t)D¯(s)
]−1
P(s, t)
×
(
Â2(s, t) + C¯(s)P̂(s, t)− B¯(s)
×
[
R̂(s, s) + B¯⊤(s)
[
I − P(s, s)D¯(s)
]−1
P(s, s)B¯(s)
]−1
×
[
B⊤(s)P̂(s, s) + B¯⊤(s)
[
I − P(s, s)D¯(s)
]−1
× P(s, s)(Â2(s, s) + C¯(s)P̂(s, s))
])
−
[
G¯⊤(s, t) + Z(s, t)B(s)
]
×
[
R̂(s, s) + B¯⊤(s)
[
I − P(s, s)D¯(s)
]−1
P(s, s)B¯(s)
]−1
×
(
B⊤(s)P̂(s, s) + B¯⊤(s)
[
I − P(s, s)D¯(s)
]−1
× P(s, s)(Â2(s, s) + C¯(s)P̂(s, s))
)
.
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Hence, we have
P̂(s, t) = P(s, t) + Z(s, t)
dP̂(s,t)
ds = Λ3(s, t,P(s, t),Z(s, t)), s ∈ [t, T ]
P̂(T, t) =M(t) + M¯(t),
(C.3)
where the explicit expression of Λ3 can be obtained from (C.1)
and (C.2).
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